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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Groh v. Ramirez (“Groh”), the United States Supreme Court 
(“Supreme Court”) asked, in the decision’s fifth footnote, whether it 
would be unreasonable for the police to refuse to present a copy of a 
search warrant at the outset of the search “when . . . an occupant of the 
premises is present and poses no threat to the officers’ safe and effective 
performance of their mission.”
1
  The majority opinion, which was 
authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, refused to answer the question.
2
 
This Essay will not only answer the Supreme Court’s question, but 
also use a significant number of legal arguments to explain why it would 
 
 M. Jackson Jones is an Assistant District Attorney for the Bristol County, Massachusetts District 
Attorney’s Office.  I would like to give thanks to my loyal confidant, Brandon Paul Ferris. 
 1. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562 n.5 (2004). 
 2. See id.  The Supreme Court refused to answer the question because it was not properly 
before the Court. 
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not be unreasonable for the government to refuse to present a copy of the 
warrant prior to the search when the occupant does not pose a threat to 
the warrant’s execution.  It is organized as follows. 
Part II will provide a discussion of the pertinent portions of the 
Groh decision. 
Part III examines search warrant presentment in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Part IV argues the reasons the Supreme Court should adopt a per se 
rule stating it would not be unreasonable for the police to refuse to 
provide a copy of the warrant at the outset of the search.  More 
specifically, this section will focus on some of the ex ante and ex post 
protections available to citizens.  These protections negate any need for 
the citizen to view the warrant because they work to ensure that the 
government does not execute it unreasonably. 
Part IV discusses the main argument in support of requiring the 
police to provide a copy of the search warrant prior to the search. 
Lastly, Part V provides the conclusion. 
II.  GROH V. RAMIREZ 
In Groh’s fifth footnote, the Supreme Court quickly discussed 
whether the police should provide a copy of the search warrant prior to 
commencement of the search.
3
  In its discussion, the Supreme Court 
noted that the Fourth Amendment did not require executing officials to 
provide a copy of the search warrant at the outset of the search.
4
  The 
Supreme Court also noted that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
did not require a copy of the warrant be provided prior to 
commencement of the search.
5
  More specifically, the Supreme Court 
noted that under Rule 41(f)(3), the executing officer has to only “give a 
copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person 
from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken; or leave a 
copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the 
property.”
6
 
After the Supreme Court recognized that neither the Fourth 
Amendment nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required a 
copy of the search warrant be shown prior to the search, it wrote, 
“[w]hether it would be unreasonable to refuse a request to furnish the 
 
 3. See id. at 562 n.5. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id.  Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(3) is the current Rule 41(f)(1)(C). 
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warrant at the outset of the search when . . . an occupant of the premises 
is present and poses no threat to the officers’ safe and effective 
performance of their mission, is a question that this case does not 
present.”
7
 
III.  SEARCH WARRANT PRESENTMENT 
A. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Require Presentment 
The Fourth Amendment is the foundation for any discussions 
pertaining to search warrants.  The amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
8
 
The text of the Fourth Amendment does not address the 
presentment of search warrants.  Consequently, the plain language of the 
Fourth Amendment does not recognize or provide a constitutional duty 
to provide a copy of the warrant at the start of the search.  Thus, “[t]he 
absence of a constitutional requirement that the warrant be exhibited at 
the outset of the search, or indeed until the search has ended, is . . . 
evidence that” the Framers did not want to provide a constitutional right 
to view the warrant prior to its execution.
9
 
B. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(1)(C) Requires Limited 
Presentment 
Rule 41(f)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
governs the execution of search warrants.
10
  Like the Fourth 
Amendment, Rule 41(f)(1)(C) does not require executing officials to 
present a copy of the search warrant at the start of the search.
11
  
 
 7. Id. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 9. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006) (citing United States v. Stefonek, 179 
F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 1999)).  In Grubbs, the defendant argued that the search warrant helped 
“assur[e] the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing 
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” Id. at 98 (citation omitted).  The 
Supreme Court disagreed. See id.  The Court wrote “neither the Fourth Amendment nor Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 imposes such a requirement.” Id. (citing Groh, 540 U.S. at 562 n.5). 
 10. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C). 
 11. See id. 
5- JONES_MACRO.DOCM 5/2/2012  12:45 PM 
86 AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY [3:83 
However, unlike the Fourth Amendment, it does, at least, provide some 
guidance as to when a property owner is entitled to see a copy of the 
search warrant.  More specifically, under Rule 41(f)(1)(C): 
[t]he officer executing the warrant must give a copy of the warrant and 
a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from 
whose premises, the property was taken or leave a copy of the warrant 
and receipt at the place where the officer took the property.
12
 
The plain language of Rule 41(f)(1)(C) requires the government to 
provide a copy of the search warrant only if property is taken.
13
  
Interestingly, this is the lone presentment requirement in the rule.  By 
clearly noting that the search warrant should only be provided if 
property is taken, Rule 41 is acknowledging that the warrant does not 
have to be provided prior to its execution.
14
  Moreover, Rule 41 is also 
recognizing that the search warrant does not have to be provided if the 
government does not seize any of the citizen’s property.
15
 
IV.  DISCUSSION:  EX ANTE AND EX POST PROTECTIONS 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution, through 
the Fourth Amendment, provides a significant number of ex ante and ex 
post protections to citizens.  For instance, in United States v. Grubbs, the 
Supreme Court recognized that:  
The Constitution protects property owners not by giving them license 
to engage the police in a debate over the basis for the warrant, but by 
interposing, ex ante, the “deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial 
officer . . . between the citizen and the police” . . . and by providing, ex 
post, a right to suppress evidence improperly obtained and a cause of 
action for damages.
16
 
Because these ex ante and ex post protections typically work 
simultaneously, they successfully ensure that the government does not 
exceed its authority when requesting or executing a search warrant.  
Thus, these protections negate any need for the citizen to view the 
warrant. 
 
 12. Id. (emphasis added by author). 
 13. See id. (emphasis added by author). 
 14. See id. (emphasis added by author). 
 15. See id. (emphasis added by author). 
 16. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006) (emphasis added by court).  Ex ante is 
Latin for “before the fact” and ex post is Latin for “after the fact.” 
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A. Ex Ante Protections 
The following subsections will discuss the primary ex ante 
protections:  a) the Fourth Amendment and b) the neutral and detached 
magistrate. 
1. The Fourth Amendment 
The main ex ante protection derives from the Fourth Amendment’s 
Warrants Clause.  This clause states “no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”
17
  The Warrants Clause is the main ex ante protection because it 
establishes the constitutional requirements for a valid search warrant.
18
 
More specifically, under the Warrants Clause, a law enforcement 
official must swear, under oath, that the information contained within the 
search warrant is true.
19
  Moreover, the clause requires the search 
warrant contain statements or facts that form probable cause to perform 
the search, as well as identify what items the police intend to seize and 
what places the police intend to search.
20
  Any search warrant that does 
not contain the aforementioned requirements is per se unconstitutional 
and will not be issued or executed by the government. 
2. The Neutral And Detached Magistrate 
Under the plain text of the Fourth Amendment, a neutral and 
detached magistrate is not constitutionally required to issue a search 
warrant.  Instead, the Supreme Court has required that a neutral and 
detached magistrate determine if a search warrant is valid under the 
Fourth Amendment.
21
  In addition to deciding if a warrant contains 
probable cause, the neutral and detached magistrate must also ensure the 
law enforcement official has sworn, under oath, that the information 
contained within the warrant is true and that the warrant has identified 
the items being seized and the places being searched.
22
  In effect, the 
 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
 18. See id. 
 19. See id.   
 20. See id.   
 21. See Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1972).  In Shadwick, the Supreme Court 
held a municipal clerk was neutral and detached even though the clerk was a “member of the civil 
service, appointed by the city clerk, ‘an executive official . . . .’” Id. at 348. 
 22. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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neutral and detached magistrate serves as a constitutional gatekeeper and 
protects citizens from the actions of an overzealous government.
23
 
B. Ex Post Protections 
1. Criminal Remedies 
i. Motions to Suppress 
The motion to suppress is one of, if not, the most important ex post 
protection available to citizens.  The motion to suppress is vital, because 
it can lead to the suppression of unconstitutionally seized evidence.  
Once evidence is suppressed, the government’s case becomes 
significantly more difficult to prove. 
The reasons for filing a motion to suppress can be quite broad.  
However, in the context of search warrant cases, motions to suppress 
typically cover four specific areas.  First, a motion could be filed if the 
search warrant was not properly executed by the government.
24
  This 
specific area covers the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the 
search.  Second, a motion could be filed if the defendant believes the 
search warrant lacks probable cause.
25
  Even though the neutral and 
detached magistrate has determined that the search warrant contains 
probable cause, the defendant has a right to have the trial judge or 
appellate justices decide whether the magistrate’s rulings were correct. 
The final two reasons a motion to suppress can be filed concern 
attacks on the search warrant itself.  For instance, a motion to suppress 
could be filed if a defendant believes the search warrant “is invalid on its 
face” or does not properly describe the property being seized and place 
being searched.
26
  In effect, the defendant is arguing that any evidence 
seized from the search warrant should be suppressed because the warrant 
has a facial defect. 
Each state recognizes that illegally seized evidence should be 
suppressed.  Typically, the rationales for suppression are based on either 
the Federal Constitution, state constitution, or both.  In addition, these 
rationales are based on the principle that any evidence obtained in 
violation of the law should not be used in a criminal trial.   
 
 23. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (noting protections of Fourth 
Amendment include having a neutral and detached magistrate determine if the government has 
established enough probable cause to issue a search warrant). 
 24. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-30 (2010).  
 25. See id.; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-33f (2010).  
 26. See id.  
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ii. Criminal Penalties for Exceeding the Search Warrant’s 
Scope 
Several states have enacted statutes criminalizing government 
officials who exceed the scope of the search warrant.
27
  These statutes 
help curb government abuses during the warrant’s execution.  More 
specifically, these statutes ensure the police are searching within the 
parameters of the search warrant. 
Typically, a successful prosecution of these statutes requires the 
government to prove two elements.
28
  First, the government must prove 
the executing official “exceeded the authority of the search warrant or 
exercised the warrant’s authority with unnecessary severity.”
29
  The 
second element addresses the mental state of the executing official.
30
  In 
other words, to prove the second element, the prosecution must show the 
executing official acted with:  1) a specific intent to exceed the warrant’s 
scope or 2) a “reckless disregard for the law.”
31
 
Any person found guilty of violating these statutes could be 
subjected to some extremely severe penalties. For example, a person 
found guilty of violating either of the aforementioned statutes could be 
heavily fined, imprisoned, or both.
32
 
iii. Executing Search Warrants Within a Reasonable Time 
Period 
Generally, government officials are required to execute search 
warrants within a specified time period.
33
  These laws ensure that 
probable cause exists when the search warrant is both issued and 
executed.  In other words, “. . . the probable cause that justifies 
 
 27. See 18 U.S.C. § 2235 (2011); IOWA CODE § 808.10 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
780.657 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 536 (2010). 
 28. See Kevin E. Lunday, Note, Permitting Media Participation in Federal Searches: 
Exploring the Consequences for the United States Following Ayeni v. Mottola and a Framework for 
Analysis, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 278, 290 (1997) (identifying the elements for 18 U.S.C. § 2234, 
the federal statute prohibiting government officials from exceeding their authority during execution 
of a search warrant). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 2235; IOWA CODE § 808.10; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.657; OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 21, § 536. 
 33. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(i) (fourteen days); ALA. CODE § 15-5-12 (2011) 
(ten days); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3918 (2011) (five days); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-25 (2011) 
(ten days); IOWA CODE § 808.8 (2011) (ten days); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2506 (2011) (ninety-six 
hours); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.15 (2010) (ten days); W. VA. CODE § 62-1A-4 (2011) (ten days); 
WIS. STAT. § 968.15 (2010) (five days). 
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execution [of a search warrant] consists of activity that may change, 
evolve, or even cease to exist with the passage of time.  Probable cause 
does not depend upon government offices being open, and it does not 
observe holidays or take weekends off.”
34
  Thus, states have found it 
necessary to establish time periods prohibiting the government from 
using stale probable cause to justify execution of a search warrant.  
Generally, the executing government official can have anywhere from 
five to ten days to execute a search warrant after its issuance.  If the 
warrant is not executed within the specified time period, it becomes 
void.
35
 
iv. Common Law Torts 
There are also several remedies available in tort law.
36
  For 
instance, a government official, who unreasonably executes a search 
warrant, could be charged with trespass to land, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, or false imprisonment.
37
  Many of these common law 
torts are codified in criminal statutes. 
2. Civil Remedies 
i. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Initially, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is part of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, was enacted to provide African Americans with a weapon to 
combat civil rights violations that occurred after the Civil War.
38
  
However, since its inception, the statute’s purpose has increased 
exponentially.  “Today, it is a widely used means of enforcing a broad 
range of rights, providing the basis of most litigation against local 
governments and local officers for constitutional violations.”
39
 
 
 34. State v. Miguel, 101 P.3d 214, 218 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
 35. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-12 (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3918 (2011); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-5-25 (2011); IOWA CODE § 808.8 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2506 (2011); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.15 (2010); WIS. STAT. § 968.15 (2010). 
 36. See Knight v. Atl. C. L. R. Co., 4 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Ga. 1933) (defining a tort as “a 
legal wrong committed upon the person or property, independent of contract.”). 
 37. See also Alicia M. Hilton, Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule After Hudson v. 
Michigan: Preventing and Remedying Police Misconduct, 53 VILL. L. REV. 47, 63 (2008) (“. . . 
assault, battery, trespass, false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and breaking and entering.”). 
 38. See id.; see also Rebecca L. Bouchard, Note, The Relationship Between the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act and Section 1983: Are Compensatory Damages an Available and 
Appropriate Remedy?, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 301, 304 (2003). 
 39. Id. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage . . .  subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . .
40
 
Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights.
41
  Instead, it 
merely provides a civil remedy for the violation of a constitutional or 
federal statutory right.
42
  In addition, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, both 
citizens and non-citizens can file civil suits against state actors who have 
infringed on their federal or constitutional rights.
43
  If a § 1983 claim is 
successful, the plaintiff could receive attorney fees, compensatory 
damages, punitive damages, or even a preliminary injunction.
44
 
ii. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, the Supreme Court ruled that citizens could recover damages 
for Fourth Amendment violations.
45
  The Court wrote, “[t]he very 
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual 
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”
46
  
The Court recognized that the plain text of the Fourth Amendment did 
not provide relief to Bivens.
47
  However, the Court noted, “it is . . . well 
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute 
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may 
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”
48
 
 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011). 
 41. See Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing 42 
U.S.C. § 1983). 
 42. See id.  
 43. See J. Matthew Mauldin, Note, Single Hiring Decisions and Municipal Entities: The 
United States Supreme Court’s Latest Safeguard Against Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. Board of the County Comm’rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997), 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L.J. 327, 334 (1998). 
 44. See id. at 332; see also Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 45. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
397 (1971). 
 46. Id.   
 47. See id. at 396. 
 48. Id. 
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V.  COUNTERARGUMENT 
The strongest argument in favor of requiring the police to present a 
copy of the search warrant prior to the search was put forth in the case of 
United States v. Thompson.
49
  The Thompson opinion essentially stated 
that the Fourth Amendment’s Reasonableness Clause mandated 
presentment of the search warrant.  This argument fails on the merits.  
First, this argument ignores the significant importance of the plain 
language of the Fourth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(f)(1)(C).  Second, this argument ignores the numerous ex 
ante and ex post protections available to citizens before and after the 
search warrant is issued. 
A. United States v. Thompson 
Under the Reasonableness Clause, all government searches must be 
conducted in a reasonable manner. When determining if a search is 
reasonable, the courts examine the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the search.  In Thompson, the court wrote, “[t]o satisfy the 
Reasonableness Clause, officers not only must obtain a valid warrant but 
they also must conduct the search in a reasonable manner . . . The 
willingness (or unwillingness) of officers to present a warrant to an 
occupant when asked goes to the reasonableness of a search.”
50
 
The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court had consistently 
held that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure requires the search warrant be presented prior to the 
search.
51
  However, in this case, several factors led the court to believe 
execution of the search warrant was unreasonable.
52
 
First, the government could not provide any reasons supporting the 
agents’ refusal to show Mrs. Thompson a copy of the warrant.
53
  
 
 49. United States v. Thompson, 667 F. Supp. 2d 758 (S.D. Ohio 2009).  The following is a 
quick overview of the facts from Thompson.  In June 2008, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives agents (“agents”) executed a search warrant at the residence of the defendant, Terry 
Thompson.  The only person present during the search was the defendant’s wife, Marian Thompson 
(“Mrs. Thompson”).  When agents entered the home, they found Mrs. Thompson naked in the 
kitchen.  The agents allowed her to put on a t-shirt.  After putting on her t-shirt, Mrs. Thompson was 
forced to wait on her patio while the police executed the search warrant.  She remained on her patio 
throughout the entire five hours of the search and was not allowed to eat or drink.  While the search 
warrant was being executed, the agents repeatedly denied Mrs. Thompson’s several requests to see a 
copy of it.  Eventually, she was provided a copy of the warrant at the end of the search. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 764. 
 53. See id. 
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Second, the government could not identify any exigent circumstances 
that supported the agents’ refusal to show Mrs. Thompson a copy of the 
search warrant.
54
  Third, Mrs. Thompson testified she was afraid the 
agents were thieves because they refused to show her a copy of the 
warrant.
55
  Fourth, Mrs. Thompson was forced to wait on her patio, in 
the middle of June, while the warrant was being executed.
56
  In fact, she 
was not allowed to have any food or water while she waited on her 
patio.
57
  Fifth, Mrs. Thompson was forced to dress while agents pointed 
their guns at her.
58
  Moreover, she was not allowed to put on any 
underwear while she was waiting on the patio.
59
  Sixth, “[t]he officers 
who searched Mrs. Thompson’s home had secured the premises and had 
Mrs. Thompson in a confined area where spoliation of evidence would 
not be an issue.”
60
  Lastly, Mrs. Thompson cooperated with the agents 
and did not interfere with their execution of the search warrant.
61
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there are numerous reasons why it would not be 
unreasonable for the police to refuse to provide an occupant of the 
premises a copy of the search warrant at the outset of the search “when . 
. . an occupant of the premises is present and poses no threat to the 
officers’ safe and effective performance of their mission.”
62
  First, 
neither the plain text of the Fourth Amendment nor the plain text of 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 requires it.  Second, there are 
numerous constitutional and statutory protections that ensure the 
executing official does not wrongfully execute the warrant. 
In essence, requiring the police to provide a copy of the search 
warrant prior to conducting the search would contradict many of the 
Fourth Amendment’s purposes.  As the Supreme Court recognized, the 
Fourth Amendment does not give individuals “license to engage the 
police in a debate over the basis for the warrant.”
63
  Our nation has a 
judicial system and judicial actors—such as judges, prosecutors, and 
 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 765. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. at 764. 
 59. See id. at 765. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562 n.5 (2004). 
 63. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006). 
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defense attorneys—that address the actions of an overreaching 
government.  Allowing ordinary citizens to substitute themselves for 
these judicial actors is not only irresponsible, but completely 
contradictory to the ideals and requirements of our Constitution. 
